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R. J. McPadden

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

May 2d, 1863.

CHAPTER I.

The Armies and Preliminary Movements.

CHANCELLORSVILLE seems to have been a tragedy of errors, and the terrible losses and sacrifices did not result in decided or satisfactory results on either side. The populous and powerful North could easily replace loss in artillery, in equipment and in men, but with the South, already enfeebled and overstrained, it was far different. The gain in cannon, in prisoners and in morale was great, it is true, but it was fearfully paid for by the victorious army. It may be said, with some truth, that the campaign was Lee's masterpiece in audacity and celerity, but his victory was like that won in ancient times by Pyrrhus, for it was indeed a mortal blow to the vitality of the Army of Northern Virginia. And it may also be affirmed, that when the shot-torn flags of Jackson's Corps were planted in triumph on the crest of Fairview at 9 o'clock on Sunday morning, May 2d, 1863, the culminating point of its daring and strength had passed, never to return. The South could not replace the host of dauntless men who went down in the campaign and desperate struggle.

Both armies moved to the front with great confidence. The Federal army felt secure and strong in its superior numbers, its splendid equipment, its devotion and its enthusiasm. The Confederate army, strengthened by the conscription act, and stimulated by the long winter's rest, also felt invincible. Moreover, the guidance of its trusty leaders.

implausibility. But the reward has been ample, in view of the fact that the labor has resulted in clearing up a wrong in our military history. Why this injustice was done to the Eleventh Corps at the time, and why it has not so long uncorrected, will be apparent to the student of our history. Machiavelli well says: "When you discover who is the author of a crime, consider who interest to commit it."

the preparation of these papers, the author has been by a great number of officers and soldiers of both

who have shown a laudable desire to ascertain the truth concerning the events occurring on Saturday,

, 1863. To the late Gen. A. B. Underwood, and to Gen. A. Dodge, the first writers of the battle on the

side, many thanks are due. To the late Col. W. J. H. Huntington, of

Pennsylvania Cavalry; Capt. J. H. Huntington, of the

Third Corps, and to many officers and

of other corps, he is under great obligations. To

the writer and the country are due. In fact, with-

assistance, the narrative could not have been ac-

ed. Many thanks are due to Gen. James H. Lane; H. Palmer, of Gen. A. P. Hill's staff; to Col. Kyd

and Maj. Jed. Hotchkiss, of Jackson's staff; to

Brigade; to Ves Chancellor, and especially to

couriers, James M. Talley and Dave Kyle.

AUGUSTUS C. HAMLIN.

MAINE, 1866.

distance by the Eleventh Corps. Generals Howard, Steinwehr, and Major Howard and Captain Hooker's staff, accompanied the troops down to the and some distance beyond. When they returned the been cast, the storm had burst, and the scene was startled the stoutest heart. The roar of the battle enveloped and destroyed Devens' Division, and the lines of infantry from the depths of the forest two miles in front, indicated that the whole of the force were gathered there for a mighty blow. Barlow three miles away, and Berry and his division, the Chancellor House, in bivouac. Hooker was still porch of the Chancellor House as oblivious of General Buell was at the battle of Perryville, when his tent and did not hear a sound of the conflict which wrecked his army, only two-and-a-half miles distant. Let us review briefly the condition of affairs Eleventh Corps at this time, and see if there is any evidence to show that the situation was understood whether the officers of the exposed corps were neglecting their duty, and whether they are deserving of any sympathy whatever.

* I think a mistake, when Howard
his staff returned he passed with
them nearly feet of me. I got
was near me and toward road
we captured a whole regiment within
"shot." I think that it must be
about twenty minutes after they
before there was any firing in
night. Four times were there near
nobody now that is probably a
dark.) a loud commotion of firing
but before the time was half past
though, the firing was from one
this while did not continue, but
my two lines were then found

We were probably 150 yards from the
Howell house J. M. Bird 1st Regt 50 S. 154th 26th 1862

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lines of infantry from the depths of the forest extendi
miles in front, indicated that the whole of the rebel arm
gathered there for a mighty blow. Barlow was the neare
e miles away, and Berry and his division, the nearest
e in reserve, was over two miles distant in rear of th
ancellor House, in bivouac. Hooker was sitting on th
h of the Chancellor House as oblivious of danger a
eral Buell was at the battle of Perryville, when he lay in
ent and did not hear a sound of the conflict which almos
ked his army, only two-and-a-half miles distant.
Let us review briefly the condition of affairs in th
enth Corps at this time, and see if there is any reliable
ance to show that the situation was understood, and
her the officers of the exposed corps were negligent of
duty, and whether they are deserving of any praise or
pathy whatever.

in a mistake, when Howard and
I returned he feared with Dev
nearly feet of me. Right Edward
me and Howard now left
was a whole regiment without firing
I think that it must have been
every minute after the battle
the was any firing in or around
war there was a slow movement
could that is probably a secondary
could command to King or one
the time was half past five. The
gunning was from one position
of the rebel army, and followed

CHAPTER VI.

Warnings of Danger Unheeded.

not known that Jackson was moving past our flank,
to escape or to attack, until Saturday morning;
between midnight of Friday and early Saturday
ing Lieutenant Colonel Carmichael, of the One
and Fifty-seventh New York, was in charge of a
of the picket line. Hearing the sounds of moving
t his front, he in the morning reported the same
quarters, and was told for his pains that new troops
sly frightened. At ten a. m. some of the officers of
s Brigade, who were keenly on the alert, observed
reported it to Howard, who had noticed it before.
Friend, the officer of the day of Devens' Division,
ed to Devens that a large force of the enemy was
ing to his rear, but Devens refused to give credit to the
Friend then went to the headquarters of the corps,
ne was rebuked for his statement, and warned not to
on a panic.
General Schurz, commanding the division in the center,
observed the rebel troops marching from east to west,
ing convinced that the flank attack would come,
Captain Dilger, in charge of the battery attached to
division, to look over the territory in rear of the estab-
line, and be prepared to meet an attack from the rear.
Battery, which was known as Independent Battery I,
was equally composed of Americans and Germans.

(55)
in which we were at the angle
the rebel army from east to
to north and south. near the Donnell
I think that we have every

was regarded as the best in the corps. It was a

ery, and had been well tested in Western Virginia

ded by Capt. Hubert Dilger, familiarly known

as "Leather Breches," from the texture of his p

ly, but resigned to take part in our civil war. He

ed officers of the Army of the Potomac and the

aining a plain captain until the close of the war.

McDougal, of the navy, whose splendid exploit

ur with the pirates in Tripoli in 1804. None

only qualities, and to such rare men, brevets and r

of praise are superfluous. Dilger followed the ad

ur Farms with the view of repelling an attack

ly in the afternoon he determined to ride out on

d flank and see for himself what truth there might

there in force. Mounting a trusty horse, and

right, where he found Von Gilsa greatly disturbe

as the enemy were in force in his front, and he w

great caution, and proceeded slowly until he rea

north of the Luckett Farm, a little more than a

ore he left Von Gilsa. Here he ran into the

in advancing, and was cut off from his line of

of cavalry, narrowly escaping cap-
ing around among the many by-paths in
to the rear of the Chancellor House.
afternoon when he reached the head-
Hooker, and he felt it his duty to make
of his reconnaissance. He approached a
of cavalry, apparently an officer of the
chiefly what he had seen, and that he be-
of the enemy was collecting in our rear.
Valley coolly advised him to proceed to his
Dilger, feeling keenly the
of this officer, went with all speed to the
the Eleventh Corps and reported his adven-
to his disgust and indignation, his remarks
about the slightest confidence, and in such a
ve him the impression that he had no busi-
out on the flank, and he was furthermore posi-
that General Lee was retreating—in full
had gone south to fall upon the rear of the
Dilger, crestfallen and tired, rode to his
the Church, and prepared for the storm which
soon to come. So confident was he of the
ack that he refused to allow his horses to be
and had hardly got his battery in order before
shots announced the driving in of the pickets.
was repeatedly warned by his officers of
of Jackson, and the evidence is too strong to
statements of Colonel Lee are well fortified
of living witnesses. Colonel Lee was the
of the Fifty-fifth Ohio, and until the untimely
General Devens had been in command of the br-
After the battle, Lee was so mortified by
Devens (it is so stated) that he resigned,
return again to the corps. He afterwards be-
Lieutenant Governor of Ohio, and at the time of
a captain of the 57th Ohio Inf-

*of the line of battle
the picket line was not over forty rods
a captain of the 57th Ohio Inf-*

** Battery "B" 7th New York*

The One Hundred and Nineteenth New York was in
 which were regarded as among the best troops of the
 in the Sixty-first Ohio, and Seventy-fourth Pennsylv
 them and carrying off in the rush many of the men, esp
 by the wrecks of Devens' Division rushing wildly th
 the line in front of the Church, but were much disorg
 New York and Sixty-eighth New York formed that p
 Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, One Hundred and Nine
 the Buschbeck line. Near the Pike, the Sixty-first
 formed the right of the last position, or what is kno
 ing, but were forced back into the woods, being flanke
 kept the enemy at bay for some twenty minutes of hard
 position as guarding the right flank with great obstina
 or more distant. The Twenty-sixth Wisconsin held
 lines on the westerly fields of the Hawkins Farm, half
 of the infantry at the masses of the enemy adjustin
 teries some distance in the rear threw its shot over the
 tery and a part of Weidrick's, and one of the reserv
 thousand men. Its left flank was protected by Dilger
 broken division, and numbered in all, perhaps, abou
 strengthened by some of the soldiers rallied from D
 Hawkins Farm. This second attempt at resistanc
 Church, to the edge of the woods on the north.
 tion of the Plank Road and Pike, along in front of th
 Pike, formed a line of battle extending from below th
 Sixty-first Ohio and Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, n
 One Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York, and parts
 York, Sixty-eighth New York, Eighty-second Oh
 their rear, and, with the One Hundred and Nineteen
 with resolution, but were forced back towards the w
 tacked with great energy and the Federal regiments
 of four powerful Confederate brigades. This line
 their left, and the three regiments calmly awaited th
 where they made a stand, with the Eighty-second Ill
 were ordered back a short distance near the Hawkin
 far to the north of the Federal position, the two r
 force of the enemy was present, and that their lines

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 to the edge of the woods on the north of
 s Farm. This second attempt at resistance
 ened by some of the soldiers rallied from D
 division, and numbered in all, perhaps, about
 men. Its left flank was protected by Digger's
 a part of Weidrick's, and one of the reserve
 me distance in the rear threw its shot over the li-
 mantry at the masses of the enemy adjusting
 the westerly fields of the Hawkins Farm, half a
 distant. The Twenty-sixth Wisconsin held
 as guarding the right flank with great obstinacy
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 urch Pennsylvania, One Hundred and Nine-
 r and Sixty-eighth New York formed that p
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 carrying off in the rush many of the men, espe
 ty-first Ohio, and Seventy-fourth Pennsylv
 regarded as among the best troops of the
 hundred and Nineteenth New York was in

Devens' Division fell back from the Talley
 the road exposed in front of the Talley House
 Digger opened fire from his six guns at the
 touching from the Pike more than a thousand
 the grove of trees in front of him was not
 to obstruct the view, and over their tops
 rapid fire of shell. A few moments after
 the battery in position on the left of Digger,
 from three-inch Rodmans upon the enemy as
 on the Talley fields south of the Pike.
 reserve batteries, supposed to have been
 opened fire from their position in rear of the
 the Dowdall Tavern. This battery did not
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THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

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J. M. Brown

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THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

... and then it actively shelled the
 ... artillery in action at this time. Weidrick's Battery
 ... until the rebels had turned the flank of the
 ... and approached along the ravine and under
 ... thickets, reaching the flank and rear of Dilger's
 ... rendering it untenable. For more than half
 ... Dilger maintained his position, and as the rebels
 ... the cover of the thickets in front of him he changed
 ... canister fire, which seemed to arrest their pro
 ... in his direct front. Hill, at this time, having no
 ... range, was obliged to withdraw his battery, and
 ... dered to the Chancellor field. Up to this time
 ... ad appeared on the Plank Road from the south
 ... to the fatuity of Colquitt, and our pickets were s
 ... a south of Dowdall's, and witnesses of the battle
 ... ing in plain sight and to the north of them
 ... deprived them of an avenue of escape in that
 ... Here they (the Seventy-fifth Pennsylvania) rema
 ... olquitt's forces came and attacked them, losing
 ... led, wounded and prisoners. The balance of
 ... it retreated by way of the ravine and south of

front of Dilger, or to his right, the Sixty-eighth
 ... undred and Nineteenth New York Regiments
 ... in line of battle, and over their heads Dilger en
 ... my in sight on the Pike or the Talley fields,
 ... els crept closer by means of the ravines and
 ... these two regiments were obliged to retire
 ... in the rear. Dilger then swept his entire front
 ... and double charges of canister, but the rebels
 ... termination and enthusiasm pressed steadily for
 ... a convinced the artillery officer that a few more
 ... could sacrifice his guns. Reluctantly he gav
 ... retire, but it was too late to save the entire ba
 ... the pieces were withdrawn safely, but the
 ... of its horses dead and two more wounded

... and did not succeed in extricating himself
 ... himself was thrown to the ground by the
 ... and until Rodes' men were close upon him,
 ... Dilger declined to listen to their
 ... and ran to the rear as rapidly as he could,
 ... spots of his pursuers. He had run about one
 ... when relief unexpectedly came to him. A
 ... the name of Ackley, who was greatly attached
 ... ed him as his battery passed by the Dowdall
 ... zing a horse, rode directly into the front of
 ... search of him. On finding his dear friend
 ... clutches of the enemy, he sprang from the
 ... isted him to mount, and both managed to
 ... ever grateful for this act of courage and
 ... s described it as one of the bravest he ever
 ... overtook the remains of his battery in the rear
 ... and, seeing that there was no position for the
 ... there, he ordered his lieutenant to proceed
 ... the guns to the rear and report to the first
 ... he might meet; the fifth gun he retained, and
 ... the road between the rifle pits, he again opened
 ... advancing and triumphant foe. The lieutenant
 ... guns up the road and reported to Captain Best,
 ... him to take position on his right, where Dilger
 ... Dilger kept one gun with him, as it was all
 ... use to advantage at the rifle pit, and this he
 ... middle of the road and opened a rapid fire to
 ... here he was supported by two companies
 ... Ohio, who stuck to him in the retreat
 ... with him also at Fatview all night, when he
 ... cannonade. Buschbeck had ample time to
 ... regiments facing south on the Dowdall Farm
 ... in the shallow and unfinished rifle pit facing
 ... Schurz's men, in battle before him, were
 ... and when General Steinwehr returned from
 ... Brigade below the Furnace, he found

R. G. McKee

The very very

ON STRIKES THE ELEVENTH CORPS.

behind the rifle pit and maintaining their position. The position known as the Buschbeck line was as follows: The Plank Road, Seventy-third Street, Pennsylvania, and by some of the companies of the Sixty-first Ohio and some of Deven's Division, and to the right the space was filled in line, and to the road, the Twenty-ninth New York, North of the road, the Twenty-ninth New York, and to the right the space was filled with the right of them, at the edge of the woods, were the second Illinois and the Eighty-second Ohio, and rods farther to the right were the Fifty-eighth, Sixty-first, and the edge of the woods the One Hundredth New York was placed in reserve. The Weidrick's Battery, which had been stationed at the Dowdall House, and in front of Buschbeck's withdrawal shortly before, with the loss of the Dowdall House. The horses of the other had been shot and the cannoners of the other had some time previously, as there was no opportunity the narrow space in rear of the rifle pit and odds.—See Map No. 6.

His last attempt to hold Jackson at bay, there had gone up the road in retreat, or were left in the Furnace. Although parts of the corps had reached them. This third and final attack of the remnants of the corps caught and wrecked the Plank Road, and by some of the companies of the Sixty-first Ohio and some of Deven's Division, and by some of the companies of the Sixty-first Ohio and some of Deven's Division, and to the right the space was filled in line, and to the road, the Twenty-ninth New York, North of the road, the Twenty-ninth New York, and to the right the space was filled with the right of them, at the edge of the woods, were the second Illinois and the Eighty-second Ohio, and rods farther to the right were the Fifty-eighth, Sixty-first, and the edge of the woods the One Hundredth New York was placed in reserve. The Weidrick's Battery, which had been stationed at the Dowdall House, and in front of Buschbeck's withdrawal shortly before, with the loss of the Dowdall House. The horses of the other had been shot and the cannoners of the other had some time previously, as there was no opportunity the narrow space in rear of the rifle pit and odds.—See Map No. 6.

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The fourth regiment was an American regi-
ment of German descent, and had been tried in
the wrecks of Deven's Division passing by.
and were in perfect order, notwithstanding
four regiments of Buschbeck who, as yet, had
it could properly hold. The left part was oc-
cupied by a completely filled with soldiers,
array of bright bayonets.

ment, and under the command of Col. Patrick H. Hooker gave great praise to this brigade for its resistance and it was the only drop of kindness he let fall in his abuse. Warren—Iago like—stated to Congress that made no fight worth mentioning.

Along this line the contest raged for some time. Hooker

states that it was an hour, but the actual fighting did not over twenty minutes, probably. The front attacks of the enemy were repulsed, but when both flanks were turned

Iverson's, Nichols', Colquitt's and Ramseur's Brigades, an enfilading fire from right and left flank reached the center of the line, the men slowly withdrew to the cover of the woods in their rear. Buschbeck's four regiments moved slowly back in perfect order, and, in complete control, had

in line of battle in the woods to check pursuit, but as the road and marched slowly towards Chancellorsvillle.

Schurz's—the Eighty-second Illinois, Eighty-second Ohio, Twenty-sixth Wisconsin, Fifty-eighth New York, and One Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York—retired in

der into the woods north of the road, unmolested by the enemy. Dillger, with his single gun, retreated in the road

keeping the enemy out of his front by his rapid discharge of canister and solid shot. The two companies of the brigade

Irishmen of the Sixty-first Ohio still supported him, besides these there were a number of officers of high rank including both General Howard and General Schurz, who also wished to help the artillerymen who composed the re-

guard of the routed corps. With the forcing of the Buschbeck line, the impetus

the enemy seemed to be broken, as there was no pressing pursuit whatever. Dillger slowly withdrew into the defile

keeping the road in front of him free with canister and solid shot, and was virtually the last man in the retreat. Shot after reaching the woods, Dillger ceased firing, as there was no enemy within range to fire at. On the north side of



** This was the Aug 9th of 1862 R. G. M. Call*

placed many of his batteries in the battle of Sunday, M...

3d, 1863. The farm consists of but few acres of cleared land, b...

there was sufficient territory to enable Stuart to plant the...

lines of battle on Fairview with a terrific fire, and in a sho...

time to determine the fate of the campaign.

General Hooker testified before Congress, nearly tw...

years after the event, that the bad conduct of the Elevent...

Corps lost him the key to his position, and the battle. I...

answer to Hooker's remarks, it may be briefly stated th...

Hazel Grove was the position lost, and that the Elevent...

Corps never were there, nor within a mile of it.

At Hazel Grove, and along the paths leading to it, we...

carelessly parked several of the batteries, wagons, and oth...

material belonging to the force then at the Furnace unde...

Sickles. At seven p. m. everything about Hazel Grove wa...

in complete repose. No one seemed to be aware that a se...

rious engagement had taken place at the Wilderness Church...

two miles distant, and that danger was approaching.

Shortly before this period, Colonel Huey, of the Eigh...

Pennsylvania Cavalry, reported to General Pleasanton, who...

he found some distance below the Hazel Grove Farm, on th...

road to the Wellford Furnaces, and not far from it, and the...

and there received orders from him to report to Genera...

Howard at the Dowdall Tavern. Colonel Huey states th...

there was nothing in the language or manner of Genera...

Pleasanton, when he gave the order, to lead him to suppo...

that a battle was in prospect, or that his services were so...

to be required. Huey returned to Hazel Grove, and found...

his regiment in bivouac in the field southeast of the Haze...

Grove House. He ordered his men to mount their horse...

and follow him. At this time the reserve ammunition tra...

of the Third Corps, with seventy thousand rounds packed...

mules, was parked in the Hazel Grove field, with many oth...

trains and batteries. It was under the command of Ge...

Daniel Hall, and when he saw the Eighth Pennsylvania Ca...

Stuart was not in the battle of Sunday, M...

B. J. McCadden
Patterson, Minn.

...towards the Plank Road, he ordered
...the cavalry, intending to resume his former
...the Chancellor House, where Berry, of the

...wended their way
...and troops halted in the open
...from the Eleventh Corps had reached

...and inform them that the wrecks of the
...by them to the rear. It is also strange
...of the distant conflict were not heard, or

...and indistinct to awaken suspicion. The
...did not seem to extend far. Sound has
...the characteristics, and in certain conditions

...The writer at one time noticed the
...Morris Island playing upon Sumner and Wag-

...than a third of a mile distant, yet the same
...after awoke him at Beaufort, fifty miles

...of fog signals has also been observed
...in connection with this peculiarity.

...with his Confederate division, was waiting to
...of Jackson's guns before attacking Hancock

...Posey and Wright, with their brigades con-
...Sickles, did not hear a sound of the

...the Eleventh Corps, and was not aware
...back from the Dowdall Tavern.

...the disappearance of Colonel Huey and
...the ammunition train, General Pleasanton

...presented a very animated sight, in which
...Eleventh Corps took very prominent parts,

...testimony of some of the narrators.

THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

any of his batteries in the battle of Sunday,
arm consists of but few acres of cleared land,
sufficient territory to enable Stuart to plant
day morning thirty or forty cannon, to enfilade

attle on Fairview with a terrific fire, and in a sh-

etermine the fate of the campaign.
ral Hooker testified before Congress, nearly

r the event, that the bad conduct of the Eleventh
t him the key to his position, and the battle-

Hooker's remarks, it may be briefly stated,
ve was the position lost, and that the Eleventh

er were there, nor within a mile of it.
azel Grove, and along the paths leading to it,

parked several of the batteries, wagons, and
elonging to the force then at the Furnace

At seven p. m. everything about Hazel Grove
e repose. No one seemed to be aware that a

gement had taken place at the Wilderness. Chur-
distant, and that danger was approaching.

ia Cavalry, reported to General Pleasanton, wh-
me distance below the Hazel Grove Farm, on

: Welford Furnace and not far from it, and
received orders from him to report to Ge-

the Dowdall Tavern. Colonel Huey states
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se. He ordered his men to mount their

him. At this time the reserve ammunition
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arked in the Hazel Grove field, with
atteries. It was under the command of
and when he saw the Eighth Pennsylvania

Pleasanton at once took command, and in his report to his view:

"I immediately ordered the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry to proceed at a gallop, attack the rebels, and check them until they could get the artillery in position." [In fact the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, with its seventy thousand rounds, had disappeared in the forest some time before.] "This service was splendidly performed by the Eighth, but with heavy loss, and I gained fifteen minutes to bring Martin's Battery into position, reverse a battery of Sickles' Corps, detach some cavalry to stop runaways, secure more guns from the retreating column.

"Every moment was invaluable. Fortunately I succeeded in forcing the enemy's columns showed themselves in the woods, in general and bearing upon the direction the rebels were coming. I supported this force I had two small squadrons of cavalry ready to charge upon any attempt to take the guns. My position was at three hundred and eighty yards from the Plank Road [the actual distance by measurement is sixteen hundred and fifty yards, and as the rebels recoiled from the onset of the Eleventh Corps, and as the guns, it was apparent we must soon meet the shock.

"It was now near the dusk of the evening, and in rear of the Eleventh Corps the rebels came on rapidly, but in silence, with their skill and adroitness they often display to gain their object. The only color visible was a Union flag with the center battalion clear up the First New York Cavalry, rode to within one hundred yards of them, when they called out to him, "We are friends, come on," and he was induced to go fifty yards nearer, when their whole line opened with musketry, dropped the Union color, displayed eight ten rebel battle flags, and commenced advancing. They were the not three hundred yards from the guns, and I gave the command fire. This terrible discharge from the guns, and I gave the command staggered them, and threw the heads of their columns back on the woods, from which they opened a tremendous fire of musketry, bringing up fresh forces constantly and striving to advance as fast as they were swept back by our guns. The struggle continued nearly an hour.

"It was now dark, and the enemy's presence could only be ascertained by the dash of their muskets, from which a continuous stream of fire was seen nearly encircling us and gradually extending to our right to cut us off from the army. Finally this was checked by our guns, and the rebels withdrew. Several guns and caissons were recovered from the woods where they fought us."

Story
The above is merely summarizing

...ant on at once took command, and in his report ... brilliantly and graphically describes what appeared

... immediately ordered the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry ... a gallop, attack the rebels, and check them until ... the artillery in position. [In fact the Eighth Pennsylvania ... its seventy thousand rounds, had disappeared in ... time before.—*Compter*.] "This service was splendid ... by the Eighth, but with heavy loss, and I gained so ... ies to bring Martin's Battery into position, reverse a ... ies' Corps, detach some cavalry to stop runaways, ... e guns from the retreating column.

... my moment was invaluable. Fortunately I succeeded, ... pieces of artillery showed themselves in the woods, in gett ... earting upon the direction the rebels were coming. ... force I had two small squadrons of cavalry ready ... any attempt to take the guns. My position was ab ... asurement is sixteen hundred and fifty yards.—*Compter* ... me left of the line of the Eleventh Corps, and as the ... in the fierce onset of the rebels through and over ... s now near the dusk of the evening, and in rear of ... rps the rebels came on rapidly, but in silence, with th ... ouble created by this flag my aid, Lieutenant Thompson ... New York Cavalry, rode to within one hundred yards ... iced to go fifty yards nearer, when their whole ... musketry, dropped the Union color, displayed eight ... ttle flags, and commenced advancing. They were th ... ndered yards from the guns, and I gave the command ... rible discharge from twenty-two pieces at that dista ... m, and threw the heads of their columns back on ... which they opened a tremendous fire of musketry, wh ... forces constantly and striving to advance as fast as th ... ack by our guns. The struggle continued nearly

... now dark, and the enemy's presence could only be ... the flash of their muskets, from which a confid ... was seen nearly encircling us and gradually exte ... cut us off from the army. Finally this was th ... and the rebels withdrew. Several guns and ... from the woods where they fought us."

... states that Lieutenant Crosby, with his battery ... with U. S. Artillery, was placed on the right of ... battery. Not a gun of this battery nor of the ... Corps was at Hazel Grove, but were at this time ... a mile away.

... estimates the attacking force of the infantry to be ... that not a shot was fired until long after ... of the army, all firing had ceased. ... every a calm quietude, in the ... of Hazel Grove and ...

and of Regt McCallister

journal. The ...

in heavily ...

five thousand muskets, and that his artillery fire was effective because he applied to it that principle of dynamics which the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection. The discharge fairly swept Jackson's men from the earth. He poured in the canister for about twenty minutes, and the affair was over." He also enlarges upon the stand at Hazel Grove of the Eleventh Corps, and says that "beef cattle, ambulances, mules, artillery wagons and horse became stuck in the mud, and others coming on crushed them down so that when the fight was over the pile of debris in that marsh was many feet high." This statement is utterly untrue and extremely unjust. None of the debris was formed by the Eleventh Corps, for their line of retreat was a mile or more directly north.

Pleasanton also says the Eleventh Corps had been camped in the woods two hundred yards distant, whereas the nearest of the left flank of the Eleventh Corps was full one thousand yards, and the right, under Von Gilsa, was more than three thousand yards distant by the nearest path.

Lieutenant Thompson, the aid whom Pleasanton sent to the front to reconnoitre, in 1866 wrote that one man fired at him as he peered into the darkness to find out who were in front of him, and his narrative of how he turned, leading the rebel charge, and how he dodged the discharges of the Federal artillery, forms a very entertaining note in the Scribner series. He also states that the enemy were mowed down in heaps, that the roar of the artillery was continuous, and the execution terrific, etc.

Doubleday, in his work on Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, one of the Scribner series of Campaigns of the Civil War, published twenty years after, and regarded as semi-official, relates the story of Keenan and his charge as follows: He states that when Pleasanton arrived at Hazel Grove, he found "all hurrying furiously to the rear."

"There was but one way to delay Jackson; some force must be sacrificed, and Pleasanton ordered Maj. Peter Keenan, commanding the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, to charge the ten thousand men in front with his four hundred. Keenan saw in a moment that if

Keenan saw in a moment that if

force into that seething mass of infantry, horses and
 down on all sides, and there would be few left to tell
 in spite of his noble countenance as he said, "Gen-
 At thirty-four years of age, literally impaled on
 the enemy, he laid down his life, and saved the army
 and his country from the unutterable degradation of
 slavery in the Northern states. History will re-
 ceived on that occasion as worthy to be classed
 of Arnold Winkelried in Switzerland, and the
 in France."

also states that "Pleasanton was enabled to
 in front of him, and twenty-two guns loaded
 canister were brought to bear upon the enemy.
 bursting over the parapet they had just taken
 and continuous yells, and formed line of battle
 into their
 hundred yards. * * * He fired into their
 all his guns at once. The discharge seemed
 now them back over the works from which they
 emerged." Doubleday also alludes to two charges
 on which reached almost to the muzzles of Plea-
 guns. He also refers to the severe enfilading fire of
 brigade, which, in spite of Keenan's charge, had
 woods and the Plank Road.

angular that Doubleday, with all the reports at
 did not know, twenty years after the event,
 was at this time six miles or more away, on the
 and did not reach Hazel Grove until after day-

more General Tiddall, in his recent, excellent
 artillery service, relates how the fugitives of
 Corps, rushing through another battery of
 position, then at the front, threw them into such
 to cause them to fall into the hands of the
 his battery I am unable to trace. Neither Gen-
 of his Chief of Artillery mentions it. Tiddall
 the confusion at Hazel Grove, the heavy fire
 from the enemy, and how the batteries, entirely
 unsupported, held the enemy in check, "com-

thoroughly checked by these batteries."
 must have had to charge through
 of getting him to back a horse

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Furthermore he says: "Had it not been for the guns at Hazel Grove, which held the enemy in check and gallant resistance offered by Huntington's twenty guns at Hazel Grove, this corps too, would have been taken in flank and rear, and would probably have shared the same fate as the Eleventh. It is difficult to estimate the value of the services of the guns at Hazel Grove."

The Comte de Paris, in his interesting work on Civil War, copies Pleasanton's descriptions of his laudable work and also Keenan's cavalry charge. That Pleasanton stops the enemy advancing in good order, and in successive lines; that he dismounts the two guns brought up in attack, and wounds Crutchfield of the Confederate artillery. Neither Crutchfield nor any of his guns were near Hazel Grove that night.

Major Stein, in his late work on the Army of the Potomac, almost thirty years after the event, repeats the romantic story of Keenan's charge, and endorses all of Pleasanton's exploits, and states that the carnage that followed the charge of the double-shotted guns would have blanch-

Major-General J. Watts de Peyster, a brilliant writer of the episodes of the war, lends his aid to immortalize the thrilling scenes, and writes in this manner: "The intricate decision as instantaneous as the electric flash, gathered his cavalry and hurled them upon the foe, until he covered his own rapidly collected guns upon a ridge, and drove them back and saved the army. That this feat of arms was averted is due to a feat of generalship and exhibition of heroism to both of which the world can be challenged to produce superiors."

Pleasanton was asked by the Committee of Congress what produced the panic in the Eleventh Corps, and replied: "The combined effect upon their imagination of the soft musketry, and the increasing yells of the rebels and

*This is correct
The gallery report etc
with
J. W. Peyster
1862
copy 1862*

*I think Mr. Pleasanton's
is a fine
P. W. B.*

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nd the increasing yells of the rebels and the

89
NEWELL JACKSON'S FATAL DELAY.
It was a theatrical effect that Stone-
ould produce better than any other man I have
the field of battle."
also informed the committee that he ordered
he gave the word, as he wanted the
genuine shock. "There was an immense body
I wanted the whole weight of the metal to check
when he gave the order "the fire actually swept
It seemed to blow those men in front clear
also stated how he cleared behind him in a marsh the
the Eleventh Corps, piled up in great confusion.
terary entertainment, Pleasanton was highly com-
and the report reads: "Although a cavalry officer,
the artillery with exceeding great judgment and
ness. His skill, energy, daring and promptness upon
ston contributed greatly to arrest the disaster which
me threatened the whole army. His conduct upon
many other occasions marks him as one of the ablest
in our service, and as deserving of far higher consid-
er than from some cause he appears to have received."
se glowing accounts of military exploits performed at
rove, as narrated, when compared with the facts or
ppear to be the facts, seem at variance, and far more
Of a place among the tales of the late Baron Man-
than the serious and truthful pages of the history
armies of the Potomac and of Northern Virginia.
too late for the authors of these false reports to
ends to the men of the Eleventh Corps, for the most
re dead; but it is not too late to correct the inscrip-
history wherein every deserving soldier receives his
ard, no matter whether he carried a musket, with
uniform, or rode at the head of a column, adorned
ord and stars. The history of to-day should cover
with equal fairness, and it should also respect the valor
Confederate soldier.
may be safely affirmed that none of the fugitives

*Do 5 154 5 1/2 by 1 1/2 inches. These guns from the
They had the finest with the rest of the army
J. W. B. of a Staff*

*The worst event from a military on to left flank
it was in line without any reinforcements.*

of the most comical episodes in the history of the Army
liantly described at the time, appears now to have been
in the Federal army, but this midnight adventure, so bri
Birney's Division of the Third Corps was one of the be
Tavern, excepting those carried there as prisoners of wa
attempted to fight. None of the First Corps saw Dowda
and more than three miles from the place where Von G
was two miles or more distant from Buschbeck's line of batt
First Corps was led by Captain Candler, of Hooker's st
Eleventh Corps, is erroneous. The position to which st
at night, occupied some of the positions abandoned by
The statement made that the First Corps, arriving
placed, four hundred yards in the rear.
in the woods at the foot of the hill where the batteries
nor Hill knew before 9.30 p. m. that Berry and his men
by the Eleventh Corps, and neither Colston nor Rodes, I
neous. Berry did not go within a mile of the positions
Berry and his men causing Jackson's Corps to halt are
ments or supports) the evening before. The report
sion overwhelmed Von Gilsa's Brigade (without entre
in quite as brief a space of time as when Rodes' rebel
*Third Corps out of its entrenchments without hesitation
battle of Fredericksburg, and swept the First Brigade of
3d of May, at seven a. m.; it struck its first blow since
attack whatever on May 2d, 1863, but on the morning of
the midnight cannonade ceased. Pender's Brigade ma
ing of security, and they tried to sleep, and succeeded
The dense woods that intervened gave Pender's men
in front of Berry, at the distance of eight hundred
Sickles, it may be said that Pender's Brigade was de
In relation to the attack on Berry, as describ
did not go within half a mile of it.
where Pleasanton saw the great pile of debris of a co
next morning through the swampy place leading to H
horse, several officers and men, and retired his tro
men. Birney lost the flag of one of his best regiments
that the stragglers arrested there were not Eleventh

more than half a mile in width, extending from Green's Brigade of the Twelfth Corps northwest to the Confederate troops of Lane's Brigade, on and near the Plank Road. Through this gap and up its ravine the grand skedaddle which Pleasanton and others have so elegantly described and erroneously credited to the Eleventh Corps, took place. Through this wide gap Williams' Division of the Twelfth Corps had no difficulty in squeezing, on returning from the front early in the evening, and it seemed broad enough for Sickles and his men to pass without attempting to open the Hazel Grove road. In fact, his troops finally reached the Fairview Plateau by this pathway in the ravine, and not a man of them went by way of the Plank Road. This broad gap remained open to the Federal arms until sunrise of the next morning, when Hazel Grove and its approaches were seized and held by Archer's Brigade of Tennesseans. A useless sacrifice of Lane's and Ramseur's Brigades of North Carolinians was made on Sunday morning, before Stuart recognized the vast importance of Archer's capture. Then about forty cannon were placed in battery in the field at Hazel Grove, which enfladed the Federal batteries and redoubts at Fairview with a rapid and withering fire, and with the assistance of Hardaway's guns, to the south and east of Chancellorsville, rendered the plateau utterly untenable, deciding the fate of the campaign in about an hour. The inoffensive midnight charge of Sickles and Birney at the Hazel Grove Farm, and the terrific cannonade at the same time from the Federal batteries at Fairview, closed the evening's entertainment. Stuart arrived about this time, and, undergoing certain what to do in the absence of Hill and Jackson, and all the members of his staff but one, commanded rest and silence. The tired Confederates soon sank to sleep, and nothing disturbed the oppressive stillness of the evening air save the renewed songs of the startled whip-poor-wills and the subdued sounds of the Federal troops building barricades for the inevitable conflict of the next morning.

X at night during hour of 7 at night
arrived the 12 in order line
my own it has your and front
and that the face of the hills
and the hills and the mountains

a mile in width, extending from Green's B...
wellth Corps northwest to the Confedera...
s Brigade, on and near the Plank Road...
gap and up its ravine the grand skedaddl...
on and others have so elegantly described an...
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SUMMARY.

Where the Blame Properly Belongs.

findings of this inquiry show, or seem to show,
that warnings of the massing of the enemy's forces
on the flank and rear of the Eleventh Corps were sent
at different times to the headquarters of the First Di-
vision. Neither do we find any evidence to show that
General Devens, Howard or Hooker took any measures after
to ascertain if the right flank of the Army of the
Potomac was free from danger. There is, however, abundant
evidence to prove that General Devens, commanding the
right flank, was warned again and again, by several of his
officers, of imminent danger from the presence of a large
force of the enemy massing on his flank and rear. But the
commander of the First Division utterly refused to listen to
any positions and the advice of his officers, and even after
the attack was commenced, he declined to allow his regi-
ments to be attacked or threatened in flank and in rear to change
while there was time to change. Furthermore, it ap-
pears that the resistance of this division, placed in such ad-
verse circumstances and overwhelmed by a vastly superior
force, all that could reasonably be expected of it. To
obtain fifteen minutes longer would have resulted in
the destruction of this division broke the formation of some of the
regiments of the Third Division—Schurz's—then drawn
up in battle in the rear to receive the impending at-
tack. Nevertheless, it appears that the rest of the Third
Division with many rallied from the wreck of the First Di-
vision and outflanked by superior numbers. It also

owns at the front market 2 when the Battery opened

DWB

(125) Washington of New York
The Battle of Chancellorsville
The Battle of Chancellorsville
The Battle of Chancellorsville

appears that many of the men of the First (Devens') the Third Divisions (Schurz's) did rally at the unfinished pits of Barlow, and did resist with Buschbeck's Brigade the presence of more than twenty thousand men, until both flanks were turned and retreat or capture was inevitable. also appears that the retreat from this third and last attack was conducted in an orderly manner, and that Buschbeck's Brigade retired in complete order. It seems that there was no active pursuit by the enemy at this time, and that the rear guard, with Diger, and one gun in the road, and Buschbeck's Brigade in battle order, retreated unmolested down the road to Fairview, where Buschbeck's Brigade formed in line of battle in front of the Federal guns, and remained there until Sunday morning.

It also appears that a large number of the soldiers of the Third Division halted, by order of General Schurz, the Bullock Road, north of the Plank Road, and protected for several hours that approach to the rear of the Chance House. Beside these, there were several hundred of the Eleventh Corps men halted behind the batteries at Fairview, where some of them remained during the night. These positions were taken before Berry's Division reached the position taken by it, about four hundred yards in advance of the Federal cannon and on the Plank Road. The attack on the Eleventh Corps at Von Gilsa's position commenced at 5.30 p. m., and ceased at 7 or 7.15, when the Federal troops retreated from the Buschbeck line, and then Jackson ordered his tired and disordered battalions to halt at and around Dowdall Tavern, two miles distant from the Chance House. The statements that Berry's Division of the Third Corps, and that Huntington's guns at Hazel Grove, had the victorious rebels, are erroneous; for no line of battle Jackson's army at the time, or during the night, approached within seven hundred to one thousand yards of Berry, dense woods intervening. And all the infantry that appeared in Pleasanton's front and in front of Huntington's guns a group of foragers from Doles' Brigade, who promptly

* Co. B-154th Regt. Va. Inf. was here, and did not
check out to the north and east
of W. Bull Run
1st Regt. Va. Inf.

Chancellor House and on Fairview was caused by and was largely composed of the troops of other corps, who came from the southward and from Hazel Grove, where the Eleventh Corps had never been. In fact, the stragglers and wrecks of the Eleventh Corps had reached the rear or vicinity of the Chancellor House some time before these stragglers took place. And at the time of the panic, the rearguard and fragments of the crushed corps were then actually in line of battle behind Dillger's guns and the Federal batteries on Fairview, or with Buschbeck's Brigade in front of the batteries or in position on the Bullock Road, nearly a third of a mile north of the Plank Road, while Barlow's Brigade of nearly three thousand men of the Eleventh Corps were three or four miles south in the woods, searching for the enemy and for Birney's Division of Sickles' Corps, and unconscious of the disasters that had taken place in their rear. The abundant abuse heaped upon the members of the corps of a German name or descent does not appear to be at all justified by fact, and it can be shown that with few exceptions they fought as well as many other troops fought under similar conditions, and that the typical German organization known as Buschbeck's Brigade acted with great firmness, and treated in perfect order in the face of the victorious enemy. The investigation clearly proves that the disastrous results of the battle of Chancellorsville cannot be justly attributed to the want of vigilance and soldierly conduct on the part of the rank and file of the Eleventh Corps. Furthermore, we may properly say that these unjust imputations and imprecations, which have been scattered far and wide over the land for the last thirty years, blighting the honor and embittering the life of ten thousand deserving soldiers, ought to have been righted long ago, and would have been if some of the West Point officers in command in the Army of the Potomac had shown common fairness, or if the War Department had ordered an impartial investigation, which was earnestly asked for by some of the officers of the corps.

Conclusion

It would be a command of the right
 Army was not in front of the right
 Howard, McLean, and Deorn Road
 have been criticized April 11

ing in front to the right flank of the Federal army. Colonel Lee these scouts to Devens and McLean, and insisted that some action should be taken, but was rebuked. After this event more scouts were sent and brought back the information that a large body of the enemy was on our right flank, and apparently resting on their arms. Captain who was attached to the staff of General McLean, states that there is proof on record that any attempt was made to ascertain the truth falsity of the reports sent in from the picket line, and he doubts if of them ever reached the headquarters of the corps.

Surgeon Robert Hubbard, of the Seventeenth Connecticut, a man distinction and of strict integrity, was present at the Valley House, some times called the Hatch House, for several hours after noon, and gave the compiler much information of what occurred there during the time. He was present both times when Colonel Lee came to inform Devens of the massing of the enemy on his flank. The second time came he brought a farmer and several scouts, who informed Devens the rebels were advancing, but Devens refused to believe it, and said Colonel Lee with decided emphasis, "You are frightened, sir!" Devens was at the time lying down on his back on a sofa nursing his leg, which had been injured by his horse running into a tree the day before. Surgeon Hubbard left the house, and had crossed the road to the north side, one of the first cannon balls fired by the enemy struck the ground between him and the Valley House. Devens, according to Hubbard's statement, was then lying on the sofa in the farm house, and there other evidence to show that this statement is correct.

NOTE NO. 8.

Further Warnings.

The warnings given at various times to the higher officers of the corps were numerous. Lieutenant Colonel Carmichael, of the One Hundred and Fifty-seventh New York, stated in writing in June that he and Colonel Lockman went on picket the night before the attack, heard Jackson's preparations, and went to corps headquarters and gave information, and received as reply: "You are new troops, and more frightened than hurt." Major Schleiter, of the Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania, was ordered to reconnoitre at three p. m., and soon returned with the information that the enemy was massed for an attack, and was sent by General Schurz to report the same to Howard. He did so his staff, and was told not to be alarmed. Schleiter heard the order of the rebel officers as they massed their lines of battle, and in 1862 published an account of it in the *National Tribune*. Colonel Richardson, of the Twenty-fifth Ohio, brought in four scouts, and reported Devens that the enemy was massing heavily a mile distant on the

... fired into them without warning, the whole
 and animals broke into utter confusion and pan-
 the vista toward Hazel Grove. Here the mass of
 I was largely increased by additions from the artill-
 ed in the direction of the Fairview Field, distant
 to the northeast. As the terrified mass of men,
 all tore through the ravine leading to Fairview, it
 name and energy by the men escaping from the
 us' Division, and also by many members of the Twel-
 returning from their support of Sickles near the
 ports of the battle at this hour, much can be found
 sition of this interesting movement, and also to pro-
 : berated Eleventh Corps were in it.
 : pe, of the First Brigade of the Twelfth Corps, says (V
 at as he emerged from the swamp to approach his
 : the Eleventh Corps falling back in disorder. T
 had fallen back to the rear some time before, most
 r previously, and none of them did he meet at this pl
 further says: "A number of my men became mit
 ng troops, and were unable to join their comrades un-
 cer to bring them forward." Colonel Quincy, of
 assets, of the Third Brigade, Twelfth Corps, says (p. 77
 n and panic at this point. "The Thirteenth New J
 brigade, broke and joined the rabble. Colonel Div
 ed and Seventh New York, of the same brigade
 his regiment was also broken in fragments. A port
 rallied with the Twenty-seventh Indiana, and also
 One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania, of the Th
 I left Hazel Grove at a high rate of speed, also came
 with Indiana without a field officer, and stayed under
 nel Cosgrove all night. There are many reports m
 Corps and Twelfth Corps and the cavalry under R
 brought to light, would clear up some of the obscur
 eddable from Hazel Grove up the ravine to Fair
 doubtedly add to the proof that the Eleventh Corps
 out that the procession was composed almost entir
 men and material of others corps.

NOTE NO. 15.

Major Huntington's Views.

A letter from Maj. J. R. Huntington, who command
 eries at Hazel Grove, May 2, 1863:

Huntington also stated in 1880, in the public press, that his
 were ready for action before the enemy fired a shot, and con-
 the assertion of General Pleasanton, he says that "A more im-
 and unfounded claim was never made."

J. R. HUNTINGTON.

Yours truly and fraternally,
 some fairly imbedded in history.
 to fight battles than it is to dig out lies about them after they
 Division Chief of Artillery, Truly,
 under the direction of a humble captain of artillery, as it hap-
 within a few yards of the spot where they had previously been
 and aligned by a distinguished cavalry general, were put
 morning; that the guns at Hazel Grove, instead of having
 by Colonel Huey, commanding the regiment,
 General Pleasanton, he was ignorant that a charge had been
 upon the defense of Bunker Hill. That so far from having been
 had no more bearing upon the defense of that position than
 Pennsylvania was made far out of sight and hearing of Hazel
 do the real facts seem! The fact is that the charge of the
 results. After this glowing description, how tame and com-
 charge of a small regiment of cavalry that produced such stu-
 The pages of history will be searched in vain for the record of
 This saving the army from destruction, and the country from the
 degrading of the establishment of slavery in the Northern
 mile from the spot in question. General Doubleday goes on to
 of the death of an officer who was killed by a musket ball
 impaled on the bayonets of the enemy." That is a poetical
 Chancellorville and Gettysburg, fell Maj. Peter Keenan,
 There, as we are told by General Doubleday in his
 into a dense wood where were the "seething ranks of a
 change that may well be called desperate, for it involved scaling
 had previously ordered the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry to
 that extraordinary order. To enable them to do so, General
 ceased, the panic stricken cannoniers, gaining fresh courage,
 in a voice of thunder: "Align those pieces!" Instantly the
 Pleasanton appeared "*Deus ex machina*," and, as one version
 :vers cutting their traces, and all that sort of thing. When
 the approach of the enemy the artillery then fled in wild dis-
 will accept as gospel the apocrypha of Pleasanton, to the effect
 public. There are those who, regarding the affair at Hazel
 to remove that groundless impression from the minds of the
 I believe that Colonel Hamlin, in his forthcoming history, will
 of the Army of the Potomac was largely due to that fact.
 without offering any resistance worth mentioning, and that
 to believe that the right wing gave way before Jackson's
 among those who think themselves pretty well up in war
 Hazel Grove, on Saturday evening. I presume there are
 on the right, and, also, in a smaller way, that of the
 presented, to use a mild term, than has the behavior of the
 occurrence of the war has been more utterly and persist-
 the battle of Chancellorville, allow me to say that in my

*The following is further evidence
 from their own accounts as far as
 J. M. Raw*

Jackson's much larger army, to the lesser and meaner one of Steuart's Third Corps' beer. After the battle, there was no one in authority found brave enough, generous enough, or just enough, to say a word in justice or in kindness concerning the corps, and since that time two of the high officers of the Army of the Potomac—Couch and Doubleday—have dared to speak a word kindly and openly in its favor. Howard, at the midnight conference held by Hooker and his confidants on Sunday night, stated to the conference that "the situation was due to the bad conduct of his corps, or words to that effect," according to the report of the meeting as given by General Couch. This unfortunate and unjust remark was accepted by Hooker and repeated by him at the hearing before the Committee on the Conduct of the War two years afterwards, and it has since been accepted far and wide as official statement. It now appears that the fault lay not with the corps but in the fault of the position, for which the rank and file of the corps are not in the least responsible. Eminent officers of Jackson's Corps freely state to-day that they did not consider that the corps was wrecked from any fault of its own, but from the inexcusable fault of its position in which the bravest troops in the world could not have resisted, without certain destruction, longer than did the Eleventh Corps. The same fact that it took Jackson's men one hour and a half to march one mile and a quarter after the attack began, is positive evidence of serious resistance. Longstreet's column of assault at Gettysburg, under Pettigrew and Pickett, numbering quite fifteen thousand men, marched the same distance and was wrecked in thirty minutes.

The loss of the campaign was due to some cause, and that cause has been generally assigned to the want of resistance of the Eleventh Corps. Howard, its commander, so stated in the midnight conference and Hooker repeated the statement in his report to Congress. Since then it has been spread broadcast over the world, to the detriment of the unfortunate corps. There surely was a cause for the defeat of an army by another army of greatly inferior strength. There was a cause and a responsibility for the disaster, and as the French historian says: "Responsibility cannot exist without a name."

Hooker, it seems, was anxious to have Howard take command of the corps, and in his letter to Stanton he plainly shows the reasons why he does so. It is chiefly the desire to get rid of Schurz, then a temporary command. And it is not hazardous much of an opinion saying that the letter, hatched in a spirit of dislike, was the cause of much disappointment and disgust. Hooker had a dislike of the corps, but why is not known. The men of the corps were fond of him, but freely filled him up with their best vituperations when he made them, but he disliked the corps nevertheless. Sickles said he did to Congress and there is other proof. The look of sardonic disdain which he when he said to Howard: "I give you the Eleventh Corps, which

...the Great, when he took to his heels at Mollwitz and rode
 ...miles before he was overtaken by the messenger of the dauntless
 ...who had stuck to the field, and finally won the battle.
 ...the powerful Third Corps, entrenched behind strong works, pro-
 ...by the fire of thirty cannon and firmly supported by other troops
 ...and men, could not resist Jackson's forces without the inspiring
 ...of Jackson, why expect the depleted Eleventh Corps to destroy
 ...with Jackson in command, when attacked under great disadvan-
 ...and when it could not muster over five thousand men to form line
 ...them, and that they were not changed for Hooker's
 ...authority that Warren asked Hooker for the return of
 ...he awakened the suspicions of Hooker's friends, and it
 ...it was false, and Warren was aware of it. Warren's
 ...and dangerous dispatch to Sedgwick may be excused,
 ...isoners.
 ...and badly defeated, with a loss of thirteen guns and
 ...he sent the dispatch to Sedgwick, Hooker's army had
 ...miles away from the position lost by the Eleventh
 ...not come into position until after midnight, and then
 ...out of range and sight of the Federal artillery; that
 ...were fired, and nearly all of his corps had halted a

E BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

...out of range and sight of the Federal artillery; that
 ...not come into position until after midnight, and then
 ...miles away from the position lost by the Eleventh
 ...he sent the dispatch to Sedgwick, Hooker's army had
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 ...it was false, and Warren was aware of it. Warren's
 ...he awakened the suspicions of Hooker's friends, and it
 ...authority that Warren asked Hooker for the return of
 ...them, and that they were not changed for Hooker's
 ...ore, it is stated that Warren recalled letters written
 ...id destroyed them, for some reason not now known.
 ...ked Seth Williams, the Adjutant General of the Army
 ...send him the reports of the battle of Chancellors-
 ...replied that he would send him on that day—July 28th
 ...rt, with map, as soon as received. Warren's report,
 ...y 12th, 1863, was not then in the hands of Williams
 ...its absence is certainly singular. The map joined
 ...as published by the War Department, is erroneous,
 ...exists then, nor do they appear to-day. It is evident
 ...er that all the reports were not then sent in—nearly
 ...the battle—and it is also evident that the present
 ...ports in the national archives cannot entirely be laid
 ...absence of these important reports is a serious loss to
 ...military history, and it is certainly suggestive of
 ...r malevolence somewhere. More than two-thirds of
 ...Eleventh Corps are not to be found, and although
 ...ffered and diligent search made for them during the
 ...one of them has been brought to light. Many other
 ...ps are also missing, and their absence evidently
 ...action on the part of the abstractor.
 ...arren made before Congress concerning Sickles and
 ...the Third Corps, seemingly in derogation, and his
 ...general of affairs and men, are not calculated to im-
 ...re student may have for his abilities or his candor
 ...y his Mecca, whence all good and perfect things
 ...Third Corps, notwithstanding Warren's malicio-
 ...an admirable corps, and contained some of the
 ...found in the Army of the Potomac, even if some
 ...from comical movements at times. The brave
 ...moments of discretion, as happened to the inter-

*It was at his headquarters when
 ...was made, I saw him and
 ...from twenty minutes before
 ...D. W. Brown*

...upon close investigation, it appears that the offense of the Eleventh
 ...was chiefly that it did not, single-handed, pulverize Jackson and
 ...with in the rear and far away from any support; that it did not
 ...front and fortify without permission from its superior officers;
 ...did have in its ranks many volunteers of German birth or of other
 ...ities who had offered their services in defense of the govern-
 ...that it did also contain a number of naturalized officers of foreign
 ...demonstrated in competitive comparison with many of those
 ...d superior knowledge of the arts of war, and who lost no
 ...to exhibit their dislike and their jealousy. These were the
 ...do with the fierce and unrelenting denunciations hurled upon
 ...of the Eleventh Corps and who sought to escape censure by declaring
 ...and shameless selfishness prevented them from exercising
 ...common dictates of fairness and humanity. For some of these
 ...always soften the vengeance of her pen.